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As a subject for study by economists, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predeces-
sor, the General Agreement on Tari⁄s and Trade (GATT), exhibit a number of interesting and
attractive features.1 First, the GATT/WTO is widely acknowledged to be one of the most suc-
cessful international institutions ever created: on this basis alone it is important to understand
the reasons for its success. Second, though it is a multilateral institution, the GATT/WTO has
adopted a bilateral approach to multilateral bargaining according to which reciprocal negotiations
(over tari⁄s) occur on a voluntary basis through time between pairs of countries or among small
numbers of countries, with the results of these bilateral negotiations then ￿multilateralized￿ to
the full GATT/WTO membership by a non-discrimination requirement that tari⁄s abide by the
most-favored nation (MFN) principle. This approach is distinctive among multilateral institutions,
raising the question whether it can help account for the success of the GATT/WTO as a negotiating
forum; and it has also left in its wake a wealth of bargaining data extending back to the creation of
GATT in 1947, the analysis of which could yield important insights for bargaining theory. Third,
while commitments negotiated within the GATT/WTO must be self-enforcing to be e⁄ective, much
like the collusive agreements among ￿rms that have been the subject of a large literature in in-
dustrial organization, the GATT/WTO contains its own explicit enforcement/dispute settlement
procedure and associated case-law history, the study of which can yield insights into the nature of
self-enforcing agreements. Fourth, while the GATT/WTO has in e⁄ect served as the constitution
of the post-war international trading system, it is a highly incomplete contract, and understanding
the nature of this incompleteness is an important task for which many of the lessons from contract
theory may be relevant. And ￿nally, most trade-policy decisions that governments face today arise
in the context of a variety of international commitments that must be considered; hence, the study
of commercial policy in international trade has in e⁄ect become the study of trade agreements,
where the GATT/WTO plays a central role.
In this Review we describe how recent economic research attempts to understand and interpret
the design and practice of the GATT/WTO. We survey both theoretical developments and related
empirical work. Our Review proceeds in four broad steps.
First, we survey the existing theories of trade agreements. We organize our discussion here
around a simple but fundamental question: What is the problem that a trade agreement might
solve? The literature identi￿es two possibilities: governments may view trade agreements as helping
them avoid ￿beggar-my-neighbor￿policies that are unilaterally attractive but mutually destructive;
or governments may view trade agreements as helping them avoid ￿beggar-myself￿policies that,
although not serving a government￿ s own ex-ante objectives, are nevertheless attractive to the
government ex post at the time when it chooses its trade policies. The latter possibility has been
1The GATT was created in 1947, while the WTO came into existence on January 1, 1995, as a result of the
Marrakesh Agreement of April 1994, also known as the WTO Agreement. The GATT continues to exist as a
substantive agreement within the WTO Agreement, but the WTO Agreement also includes a set of additional
agreements that build on and extend GATT principles to new areas. Hoekman and Kosteki (2001) provide an
excellent institutional overview of GATT and the WTO.
1formalized in the literature, and it has been suggested that trade agreements may indeed play this
role. But it is the ￿rst possibility ￿that trade agreements help governments avoid beggar-my-
neighbor trade policies ￿that is embodied in the theoretical attempts to understand and interpret
the key design features of the GATT/WTO. And so it is this possibility that makes up the primary
focus of our survey. Strikingly, as we describe below, in a wide variety of formal settings the beggar-
my-neighbor trade policies which give rise to the need for a trade agreement are driven by a single
underlying motivation: terms-of￿ trade manipulation.
The essential insight that terms-of-trade manipulation can give rise to a problem that a trade
agreement might solve dates back to Mill (1844) and Torrens (1844), and the ￿rst formal treatment
of the idea was provided by Johnson (1953-54). But terms-of-trade manipulation is often dismissed
as an empirically irrelevant possibility.2 Given the central role that terms-of-trade manipulation
is now understood to play in theories of trade agreements, it is therefore important to revisit the
empirical evidence on this basic question. This is the second step of our Review. Here we survey
the growing body of empirical literature and suggest that the empirical relevance of terms-of-trade
manipulation is much greater than has been widely believed.
In the third step of our Review, we describe the GATT/WTO architecture and brie￿ y trace
its historical antecedents. We suggest that the design of GATT re￿ ects lessons learned from the
successes and failures experienced over decades of European and U.S. tari⁄ bargaining.
This sets the stage for our fourth and ￿nal step, where we draw on the recent theoretical
and empirical literature to interpret the design and practice of the GATT/WTO. Our discussion
highlights three of the most central features of the GATT/WTO ￿reciprocity, non-discrimination
and enforcement/dispute settlement.
2 What is the Purpose of a Trade Agreement?
All theories of trade agreements must identify a reason why negotiating governments can gain from
the agreement. This involves identifying a ￿problem￿that would arise absent an agreement, when
governments make noncooperative trade-policy choices. The purpose of the agreement can then be
viewed as providing a ￿solution￿to the problem, and the negotiating governments may share in
the associated bene￿ts. It is not just con￿rming the existence of a problem that is important: a
clear understanding of the problem and its structure can also provide important guidance for the
design of an institution that can most e⁄ectively aid governments in their e⁄orts to ￿nd a solution.
One branch of the literature posits that important international externalities arise when govern-
ments make trade-policy choices, and that the purpose of a trade agreement is then to internalize
these externalities. We survey this approach in section 2.1 The other branch of the literature posits
that governments face important commitment problems with regard to the private sector when they
make trade-policy choices, and that the purpose of a trade agreement is then to serve as an external
commitment device that can ￿tie the hands￿of its members. We brie￿ y survey this approach in
2See, for example, Krugman (1997) and Regan (2006).
2section 2.2.
2.1 Addressing Beggar-My-Neighbor Policies
When a government pursues a beggar-my-neighbor policy, a portion of the bene￿ts that it perceives
from the policy comes at the expense of other countries. This describes an international externality
associated with the government￿ s policy choice. But what form does the international externality
take?
To answer this question, we start with a setting in which markets are perfectly competitive,
we describe and interpret the terms-of-trade externality that can arise, and we show that the
realistic possibility that governments pursue political/distributional objectives does not introduce
additional international externalities. In so doing, we present the central insights from the terms-
of-trade theory of trade agreements. We then allow the possibility that markets are not perfectly
competitive, we describe the new international externalities that can arise in this alternative setting,
and we consider the possibility that these new externalities might give rise to alternative theories
of trade agreements.
2.1.1 Terms-of-Trade Externalities
In the benchmark setting of perfectly competitive markets, a famous result holds that unilateral free
trade is optimal, when a government maximizes national income and presides over a small country.3
For an economist seeking to understand the GATT/WTO, this result is initially discouraging,
since in these circumstances governments have no reason to pursue reciprocal tari⁄ liberalization
through GATT/WTO negotiations. Nevertheless, the result is instructive. It suggests that a trade
agreement might solve a problem that arises because governments have political objectives and/or
preside over large countries.
Clearly, real-world governments have political motivations and are interested not just in the size
of national income but also in its distribution. And the optimal unilateral policy for a politically
motivated government may not be free trade. But this is not the same as saying that political
considerations represent a problem that governments might use a trade agreement to solve. Indeed,
as we discuss below, in the leading political-economy models of trade policy, governments of small
countries do not gain from a trade agreement among themselves; thus, in these models, politics
alone cannot explain the appeal of a trade agreement.
What if governments preside over large countries? As we observed in the Introduction, that
governments of large countries may succumb to the temptation to engage in terms-of-trade manipu-
lation and thus gain from a trade agreement is not a new insight. Many trade economists, however,
have objected to using this theory to explain actual trade agreements. In part these objections
are empirical, and we survey the evidence in section 3. But in part these objections are rooted in
3We abstract from domestic distortions for the purposes of this discussion, although the main points of this section
carry over to the case of perfectly competitive markets in which domestic distortions are present (see Bagwell and
Staiger, 2001a).
3the way that the terms-of-trade theory has been traditionally developed. One objection is that the
important political constraints under which real-world governments operate are omitted from the
theory. A second objection is that the theory does not capture the way that actual governments
think. The ￿terms of trade￿are rarely mentioned in actual trade-policy debates, for example. We
argue below, though, that these objections are less damaging for the terms-of-trade theory than
they might initially appear. The theory can be generalized to include political objectives, and it
also may be understood in terms of the market-access language that arises in trade-policy debates.
To develop these points, we ￿rst review the textbook two-good general-equilibrium model of
trade between two countries. We next de￿ne a general family of government preferences. Using this
framework, we then characterize and interpret the problem that a trade agreement can solve.
The Model Two countries, domestic and foreign, trade two goods which are normal in con-
sumption and produced in perfectly competitive markets under conditions of increasing opportunity
costs.4 We let x (y) denote the natural import good of the domestic (foreign) country. The local rel-
ative price facing domestic (foreign) producers and consumers is de￿ned as p ￿ px=py (p￿ ￿ p￿
x=p￿
y).
We assume that tari⁄s are non-prohibitive and represent the domestic (foreign) ad valorem import
tari⁄ as t (t￿). Letting ￿ ￿ (1 + t) and ￿￿ ￿ (1 + t￿), we then have that p = ￿pw ￿ p(￿;pw) and
p￿ = pw=￿￿ ￿ p￿(￿￿;pw), where pw ￿ p￿
x=py is the ￿world￿ (i.e., untaxed) relative price.5 The
foreign terms of trade is given by pw, and the domestic terms of trade is thus 1=pw. We interpret
￿ > 1 as an import tax and similarly for ￿￿.6
In each country, production levels for x and y are determined by the local relative price. Do-
mestic and foreign production functions may then be written as Qi = Qi(p) and Q￿
i = Q￿
i(p￿) for
i = fx;yg. National consumption is a function of local and world prices, Ci(p;pw) and C￿
i (p￿;pw)
for i = fx;yg: the local relative price de￿nes the trade-o⁄ faced by consumers, and it also deter-
mines the level and distribution of factor income; and together with the local price, the world price
determines tari⁄ revenue (which is distributed lump-sum to consumers). Imports of x and exports
of y for the domestic country are then respectively de￿ned by Mx(p;pw) ￿ Cx(p;pw) ￿ Qx(p) and
Ey(p;pw) ￿ Qy(p) ￿ Cy(p;pw). For the foreign country, we similarly de￿ne imports of y and ex-
ports of x as M￿
y(p￿;pw) and E￿
x(p￿;pw), respectively. For any prices, domestic and foreign budget
constraints are represented as




The equilibrium world price, e pw(￿;￿￿), is determined by the requirement of market-clearing for
4Henceforth, we distinguish foreign variables from domestic by placing an asterisk on the former.
5Below, we simplify notation and use p to denote the function p(￿;p
w), and p




6Lerner symmetry implies that it is immaterial whether trade taxes and subsidies are depicted as applying to the
import good or rather the export good.
4good y:
Ey(p(￿; e pw); e pw) = M￿
y(p￿(￿￿; e pw); e pw); (3)
where we make explicit in (3) the functional dependencies for local prices. Market clearing for good
x is now guaranteed by (1), (2) and (3).
We assume that the Metzler and Lerner paradoxes are ruled out; thus, we assume dp=d￿ >
0 > dp￿=d￿￿ and @e pw=@￿ < 0 < @e pw=@￿￿. The ￿nal two inequalities indicate that each country is
￿large￿ : each country can improve its terms of trade by increasing its tari⁄.
Government Preferences The traditional approach to representing government preferences is
to impose the assumption that governments maximize national income (Kowalczyk and Riezman,
2009, survey the traditional approach). By contrast, in the political-economy approach, govern-
ments are motivated by distributional concerns. Here, we follow Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 2002b)
and adopt a general approach to modeling government preferences, representing the objectives of
the domestic and foreign governments with the general functions W(p; e pw) and W￿(p￿; e pw), respec-
tively. We thus represent welfare in terms of the prices that the tari⁄s induce rather than directly
in terms of the tari⁄s themselves.
We place no restrictions on government preferences over local prices: as local prices determine
the level and distribution of factor incomes, this allows us to incorporate a wide range of political
motivations. In fact, we impose only one assumption on the welfare functions. We assume that,
holding its local price ￿xed, each government experiences an improvement in its welfare when its
terms of trade improve:
We pw < 0 and W￿
e pw > 0: (4)
To understand condition (4), it is helpful to consider the underlying tari⁄changes that could induce
a change in the world price while leaving unaltered a country￿ s local price. Consider the domestic
government. If we hold ￿xed the foreign tari⁄ and increase the domestic tari⁄, then under our
assumptions the world price e pw falls and the local price p rises. Thus, a unilateral tari⁄ hike gives
the domestic country an improved terms of trade but also changes the domestic local price. We thus
cannot understand (4) by considering a domestic tari⁄ change in isolation. Let us then imagine
that we increase the domestic tari⁄ and at the same time lower the foreign tari⁄. This change
again leads to a lower world price (i.e., a terms-of-trade gain for the domestic country), but we can
calibrate a change of this kind that leaves the domestic local price unaltered. The meaning of (4)
is thus that the domestic government values the international income transfer that is implied by an
increase in the domestic tari⁄ and a decrease in the foreign tari⁄ that together leave the domestic
local price unaltered. An analogous interpretation applies for the foreign government.
The welfare functions presented here are quite general; indeed, governments maximize wel-
fare functions of this form in both the traditional approach and in the leading political-economy
approaches to trade policy. Dixit (1987), Johnson (1953-54), Kennan and Reizman (1988) and
Mayer (1981) o⁄er important formalizations of the traditional approach. In these formalizations,
5governments maximize national income, and the national income of a country improves when it
experiences a terms-of-trade improvement. In the political-economy literature, Mayer (1984) shows
that, under a representative democracy, the government sets its trade policy to promote the inter-
ests of the median voter, whose utility can be represented as a function of this form. As Baldwin
(1987) shows, other major approaches to the political economy of trade policy employ government
welfare functions of this form as well.7 Finally, the lobbying models of Grossman and Helpman
(1994, 1995) are also included in the framework presented here.
Unilateral Policies We consider now the unilateral policies that governments would select if
they were to interact noncooperatively. Suppose, then, that each government sets its tari⁄ policy
to maximize its welfare, for any given tari⁄ choice of its trading partner. The associated tari⁄
reaction curves are de￿ned implicitly by
Wp + ￿We pw = 0; and (5)
W￿
p￿ + ￿￿W￿
e pw = 0; (6)
where ￿ ￿ [@e pw=@￿]=[dp=d￿] < 0 and ￿￿ ￿ [@e pw=@￿￿]=[dp￿=d￿￿] < 0. As these expressions high-
light, the best-response tari⁄of each government strikes a balance between the e⁄ects on its welfare
of the local- and world-price movements induced by its tari⁄ choice.
To gain further insight, let us focus on the domestic government. Starting with an initial tari⁄
pair (￿;￿￿), we suppose that the domestic government unilaterally increases its tari⁄ and thus
induces a ￿nal tari⁄ pair (￿1;￿￿). As noted above, a unilateral hike in the domestic tari⁄ leads to
a lower world price e pw and a higher domestic local price p. As suggested by (5), however, we can
disentangle this combined change in prices into separate changes in the world and domestic local
prices. We do this by imagining that the movement from the initial tari⁄ pair to the ￿nal tari⁄
pair is taken in two steps. In the ￿rst step, we imagine raising the domestic tari⁄ and lowering
the foreign tari⁄, so as to preserve the domestic local price. As explained above, when tari⁄s are
adjusted in this way, the world price falls. Suppose that we adjust tari⁄s in this ￿rst step until we
reach the point at which the world price is reduced to the same level that it achieves at the ￿nal
tari⁄ pair (￿1;￿￿). At this point, we initiate the second step and raise the domestic and foreign
tari⁄s in a way that preserves the world price. When we adjust tari⁄s in this fashion, the domestic
local price rises. We adjust tari⁄s in this second step until we reach the ￿nal tari⁄ pair (￿1;￿￿).
Across the two steps, we lower the foreign tari⁄and then raise it back to its initial level, so that
the only tari⁄change that remains in the end is the domestic tari⁄hike. By breaking the movement
into two steps, however, we can isolate the world and local price changes that are identi￿ed in (5).
In the ￿rst step, the domestic local price is unaltered and the world price falls. The e⁄ect on
7See, for example, Olson (1965), Caves (1976), Brock and Magee (1978), Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982), Findlay
and Wellisz (1982) and Hillman (1982).
6domestic welfare of a change in the world price is captured in (5) with the term We pw. The second
step by contrast ￿xes the world price at its ￿nal level and allows the domestic local price to rise
from its initial level to its ￿nal level. In (5), the e⁄ect on domestic welfare of a change in the local
price is captured with the term Wp. We may interpret (6) for the foreign government similarly.
We now arrive at an important observation. The welfare implications of the local-price move-
ment in the second step are domestic in nature. In particular, they re￿ ect the trade-o⁄ for the
domestic government between the costs of the induced economic distortions and the bene￿ts of
any induced political support. By contrast, the welfare implications of the world-price movement
in the ￿rst step are international in nature. Speci￿cally, they re￿ ect the bene￿ts to the domestic
government of shifting some of the costs of its policy choice onto the foreign government. The
cost shifting occurs, since an improvement in the domestic country￿ s terms of trade corresponds
necessarily to a deterioration in the foreign country￿ s terms of trade.
In a Nash equilibrium, both governments must be on their respective reaction curves, and a Nash
equilibrium tari⁄ pair (￿N;￿￿N) thus satis￿es (5) and (6). We take this equilibrium to represent
the trade-policy decisions that governments would make if there were no trade agreement.
Trade Agreement Governments value a trade agreement if it leads to changes in trade policies
that generate Pareto improvements for governments relative to the welfare that they experience
in the Nash equilibrium. Thus, a trade agreement is potentially valuable if and only if the Nash
equilibrium is ine¢ cient, when e¢ ciency is measured relative to government preferences. This dis-
cussion motivates further consideration of the Nash equilibrium and its relationship to the e¢ ciency
frontier.
Three observations can be stated.8 The ￿rst observation is that Nash tari⁄s are indeed inef-
￿cient. The second observation is that both governments can enjoy welfare gains relative to the
Nash equilibrium only if each agrees to set its tari⁄ below its Nash level. The ￿rst observation
means that a mutually bene￿cial trade agreement is possible, while the second observation implies
that reciprocal trade liberalization is necessary for mutual gains. These ￿rst two observations are
intuitive and follow from our discussion above. When a government contemplates an increase in its
unilateral tari⁄, it foresees an improvement in its terms of trade; thus, it is in part motivated by the
prospect of shifting some of the costs of the tari⁄hike onto its trading partner, whose terms of trade
would deteriorate. The incentive to shift costs naturally leads to ine¢ cient policies. Further, the
ine¢ ciency takes a particular form: the possibility of cost shifting leads governments to set tari⁄s
higher than is e¢ cient. Consequently, if both governments are to bene￿t from a trade agreement,
then each must lower its tari⁄ below its Nash level.
As our discussion indicates, the terms-of-trade externality is one reason for the ine¢ ciency
of the Nash equilibrium. To see if it is the only reason, we consider a hypothetical world in
which governments are not motivated by the terms-of-trade implications of their unilateral trade-
policy choices; that is, we consider a hypothetical noncooperative setting in which We pw ￿ 0 and
8Formal proofs of these observations can be found in Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 2002b).
7W￿
e pw ￿ 0.9 We therefore de￿ne politically optimal tari⁄s as any tari⁄pair (￿PO;￿￿PO) that satis￿es
the following two conditions:
Wp = 0 and W￿
p￿ = 0:
The key question is whether the politically optimal tari⁄s are e¢ cient. If the answer is a¢ rmative,
then we may conclude that the terms-of-trade externality is the sole rationale for a trade agreement.
The third observation is that the politically optimal tari⁄s are indeed e¢ cient. To see why,
suppose that each government sets its trade policy at its politically optimal level. We note that
each government then achieves its preferred local price, given the politically optimal world price.
Starting at the political optimum, consider the e⁄ects of a small increase in the domestic tari⁄.
The ￿rst e⁄ect is that the domestic local price rises by a small amount. This e⁄ect has no ￿rst-
order impact on the welfare of the domestic government, however, since the domestic government
initially has its preferred local price. The second e⁄ect is that the foreign local price falls by a
small amount. But the foreign government also initially has its preferred local price; thus, this
e⁄ect has no ￿rst-order impact on the welfare of the foreign government. Finally, the third e⁄ect is
that the world price falls by a small amount. This terms-of-trade change, however, cannot generate
an e¢ ciency gain, since it represents a pure international transfer from the foreign government to
the domestic government in the form of tari⁄ revenue. Consequently, starting from the political
optimum, a small increase in the domestic tari⁄ cannot generate a Pareto improvement for the
governments. The e⁄ects of a small increase in the foreign tari⁄ can be similarly analyzed. Thus,
once the terms-of-trade motivation is removed from the trade-policy choices of governments, an
e¢ cient outcome is achieved, and there is nothing further for a trade agreement to accomplish.
To appreciate the role of our large-country assumption, it is instructive to relax this assumption
momentarily and consider an alternative setting in which politically motivated governments preside
over small countries. The government of a small country would recognize that it is unable to alter the
terms of trade with its trade policy; thus, in this alternative setting, the terms-of-trade motivation
is automatically eliminated from the trade-policy decisions of each government. When selecting
their unilateral trade policies, the governments of small countries would thus choose politically
optimal tari⁄s; hence, their Nash policies would be e¢ cient. In the leading political-economy
models of trade policy, therefore, the governments of small countries have no reason to form a
trade agreement among themselves. Our brief detour to the alternative small-country setting thus
con￿rms the general conclusion derived above: the value of a trade agreement is attributable to
the terms-of-trade externality that is associated with the trade-policy choices of large countries.
The politically optimal tari⁄s are of course not the only e¢ cient tari⁄s. For example, in the
special case where governments maximize national welfare, Mayer (1981) shows that e¢ cient tari⁄s
satisfy ￿ = 1=￿￿. For this case, the politically optimal tari⁄s correspond to reciprocal free trade
9Importantly, we do not assume here that governments fail to understand the terms-of-trade e⁄ects of their tari⁄
choices. Rather, in the context of (5) and (6), we allow that governments understand that ￿ < 0 and ￿
￿ < 0, but we
now hypothesize that We pw ￿ 0 and W
￿
e pw ￿ 0. Our approach is to characterize the non-cooperative tari⁄s that would
be selected by governments with these hypothetical preferences and then to evaluate the e¢ ciency of these tari⁄s
with respect to actual government preferences.
8and thus rest on the e¢ ciency frontier at the point ￿ = ￿￿ = 1.10 A trade agreement enables
governments to move from the ine¢ cient Nash tari⁄s to some point on the contract curve, where
the contract curve is that portion of the e¢ ciency frontier on which neither government receives
below-Nash welfare. The politically optimal tari⁄s lie on the contract curve, provided that the
countries are not too asymmetric. When the politically optimal tari⁄s rest on the contract curve,
they are focal in the sense that they remedy the terms-of-trade ine¢ ciency in a direct way.
Summarizing, we have argued that the purpose of a trade agreement is to provide governments
with an escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners￿Dilemma. This rationale for a trade agree-
ment requires that countries are large, so that they can alter the terms of trade with their trade
policies; however, it holds whether or not governments have political/distributional objectives.
Interpreting the Terms-of-Trade Externality The discussion above con￿rms what is at bot-
tom a very simple idea: governments can gain from negotiating a trade agreement, if each would
otherwise attempt to shift costs onto the other and as a consequence adopt ine¢ cient unilateral
policies. Viewed in this way, the terms-of-trade externality is simply the mechanism through which
such cost shifting would occur. As noted in the Introduction, however, many economists are skepti-
cal of the practical relevance of the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements. We now acknowledge
and address two of the main objections to this theory.
The ￿rst objection is that the terms-of-trade theory is traditionally advanced under the assump-
tion that governments maximize national income whereas real-world governments have political as
well as economic objectives. In fact, we have already addressed this objection above. As we show
there, the terms-of-trade rationale for a trade agreement holds as well when governments have
political motivations.
The second objection is that the theory does not re￿ ect the way that actual governments think.
The theory seems to emphasize abstract general-equilibrium reasoning that might not resonate
with practical policy makers, and indeed the ￿terms of trade￿ as such are rarely mentioned in
trade-policy debates. In response to this objection, we stress that the terms-of-trade theory also
may be interpreted in ways which suggest greater practical relevance. First, while we present the
theory using a general-equilibrium model above, the theory can also be developed in the context of
a partial-equilibrium model. In the partial-equilibrium model, cost shifting occurs through changes
in the terms of trade provided that the import tari⁄ is not fully passed through to domestic prices.
Intuitively, foreign exporters then bear some of the incidence of the tari⁄. In this setting, we can thus
immediately understand that unilateral tari⁄s are ine¢ cient, since the domestic government fails to
internalize the cost of lost pro￿ts that its import tari⁄imposes on foreign exporters.11 Second, real-
world trade-policy negotiations are conducted using the language of ￿market access,￿and the terms-
of-trade theory can easily be translated into this language. When the domestic government raises
10The politically optimal tari⁄s generally di⁄er from reciprocal free trade when governments have politi-
cal/distributional objectives.
11In Bagwell and Staiger (2001b), we employ a partial-equilibrium model, derive the three observations mentioned
above, and further develop this interpretation.
9its import tari⁄ and thereby shifts in its import demand curve, the resulting ￿price e⁄ect￿under
which the domestic country enjoys a terms-of-trade improvement is accompanied by a ￿volume
e⁄ect￿under which the foreign country experiences a reduction in access to the domestic market.
Once this link between price and volume e⁄ects is forged, the terms-of-trade theory can be developed
using the market-access language that trade-policy negotiators adopt.12
2.1.2 Other International Externalities
Our discussion thus far has proceeded from a backdrop in which markets are assumed to be perfectly
competitive. The perfectly competitive paradigm o⁄ers a valuable benchmark for understanding
the purpose of trade agreements, but in many markets ￿rms possess market power. An extensive
literature has established that imperfectly competitive markets can give rise to ￿pro￿t-shifting￿and
￿￿rm-delocation￿e⁄ects that provide novel motives for unilateral trade-policy intervention (see, for
example, the integrative treatment of this literature in Helpman and Krugman, 1989). This suggests
that other international externalities in addition to the terms-of-trade externality might arise in
markets with imperfect competition, raising the possibility as well that new rationales for trade
agreements beyond the terms-of-trade rationale might then be identi￿ed in these settings.
Ossa (2009) explores the role of trade agreements in imperfectly competitive environments. He
considers a monopolistically competitive setting of two-way trade in similar products, in which ￿rms
produce di⁄erentiated products under conditions of free entry and compete for sales both in the
home market and abroad, and where exporting the product abroad involves shipping costs. In such
an environment, Venables (1987) has shown that a ￿rm-delocation motive for trade policy arises: if
the domestic country imposes a tari⁄ on its imports or o⁄ers a subsidy to its exports, then foreign
￿rms can be ￿delocated￿to the home market, and domestic consumers save on trade costs and
enjoy a lower overall price index; the domestic consumers￿gain, however, comes at the expense of
foreign consumers, whose price index rises. Importantly, Ossa shows that the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect
represents a beggar-my-neighbor policy that does not travel through the terms-of-trade externality.
In terms of the representation of welfare introduced above, the novel international externality
identi￿ed by Ossa (2009) takes the form of a local-price externality: in each government￿ s welfare
function, the local price in the other country enters directly, in addition to its own local price and
the world prices.13 Intuitively, each government now cares directly about the local price in the
other country￿ s market, because each government would rather have more of the world￿ s ￿rms (and
the production of their individual varieties) located locally rather than abroad to save on transport
costs, and the equilibrium pattern of ￿rm location across countries depends on local prices in both
countries via the free-entry condition.
As it turns out, this local-price externality arises in other imperfectly competitive environments
as well. In particular, Bagwell and Staiger (2009b) explore imperfectly competitive environments
12For a formal de￿nition of market accees and further development of the relationship between the terms-of-trade
theory and the language of market access, see Bagwell and Staiger (2002b).
13For a development of this representation in the ￿rm-delocation model, see Bagwell and Staiger (2009a).
10in which entry is not free and monopoly/oligopoly pro￿ts exist, and where the well-known (Brander
and Spencer, 1981, 1984a,b, 1985) pro￿t-shifting motive for trade-policy intervention arises.14 Here
as well, governments care directly about the local prices in the markets of their trading partners, in
addition to their own local prices and the world prices. In this case, the reason is that governments
care about the pro￿ts of their ￿rms, and ￿rm pro￿ts depend in part on the volume of export sales
which is in turn in￿ uenced by local prices in the export destination market.
Hence, in the presence of imperfect competition, new international externalities can indeed arise;
in addition to the terms-of-trade externality that travels through the world price, there are also
local-price externalities that travel through domestic and foreign local prices when ￿rm-delocation
or pro￿t-shifting e⁄ects are present. This implies that the international policy environment is more
complex than in the case of perfectly competitive markets, and it raises the possibility that the
task of a trade agreement may be more complicated in this environment as a result. To assess this
possibility, however, we must ask whether governments would make unilateral policy choices that
internalize these international externalities in an appropriate fashion from a world-wide perspective,
whatever form these externalities might take, and if not, why not.
It is readily established and unsurprising that unilateral policy choices in this environment are
indeed ine¢ cient. After all, the terms-of-trade (world-price) externality that drives the ine¢ ciency
in the competitive setting is still present here, and now there are additional (local-price) externalities
as well. But when the question of what accounts for the ine¢ ciency is posed as we posed this
question above, and the e¢ ciency properties of politically optimal tari⁄s are evaluated, a surprising
answer emerges: the sole rationale for a trade agreement in this environment is again to remedy
the ine¢ ciency attributable to the terms-of-trade externality, the same rationale that arises in
perfectly competitive markets. More speci￿cally, if governments could be induced to not value
the pure international rent-shifting associated with the terms-of-trade movements caused by their
unilateral tari⁄ choices, then their tari⁄ choices would be e¢ cient and there would be nothing left
for a trade agreement to do.15 Intuitively, when governments adopt politically optimal tari⁄s, they
are not motivated to impose terms-of-trade externalities on each other, and they are thus freed
to use their trade policies to achieve their preferred local prices, the achievement of which then
ensures that the international externalities associated with local-price movements are eliminated
(to the ￿rst-order) as well.
It is worth pausing to re￿ ect on this last point. As we have observed, in the presence of imper-
fectly competitive markets, local-price externalities can arise; however, at the political optimum,
where governments would be led if they did not value the world-price externalities, the local-price
externalities disappear and the outcome is e¢ cient. Still, in general these local-price externalities
would be operative away from the political optimum, and they may therefore represent an im-
portant feature for a trade agreement to address, if the agreement is not designed to deliver the
14A related exploration is contained in Bagwell and Staiger (2002b, Ch. 9), though the representation of welfare
as exhibiting a local-price externality is not developed there. See also the recent analysis of Mrazova (2009).
15This result is established for the ￿rm-delocation model in Bagwell and Staiger (2009a) and for the pro￿t-shifting
model in Bagwell and Staiger (2009b).
11political optimum. For example, as Ossa￿ s (2009) ￿ndings demonstrate, and as discussed further
in Bagwell and Staiger (2009a), if governments were constrained in their use of export policies the
political optimum could not in general be reached, and in this case the local-price externalities
become an important component of the problem that governments must solve in this environment.
This observation takes on special relevance in the present context, as the GATT/WTO restricts the
use of export subsidies. In this light Ossa￿ s ￿ndings can be interpreted as characterizing a problem
that arises when export subsidies are banned. At the same time, this interpretation falls short of
delivering a fundamental rationale for a trade agreement, because it appeals to the existence of a
trade agreement (on export subsidies) to explain the purpose of a trade agreement.
Finally, we note that in both the competitive paradigm and in each of the imperfectly compet-
itive environments that we have discussed, international (world) prices are determined by anony-
mous market-clearing conditions. But for many international transactions, the international prices
at which the associated goods or services change hands are determined as a result of bilateral bar-
gaining between the domestic purchaser and the foreign supplier. When international prices are
determined in this way, Antras and Staiger (2008) show that the mechanism by which countries
shift the cost of their policy intervention on to trading partners becomes more complex, and the
possibility of a novel ￿political externality￿along the lines suggested by Ethier (2004) may arise
and pose an independent problem for a trade agreement to solve. In light of the broad set of market
structures in which beggar-my-neighbor problems can be given a terms-of-trade interpretation, the
￿nding of a novel beggar-my-neighbor problem that can arise under certain conditions and cannot
be given a terms-of-trade interpretation ￿and which suggests a distinct rationale for a trade agree-
ment ￿is signi￿cant and warrants further attention, but the literature has not yet gone beyond the
identi￿cation of this possibility.
2.2 Addressing Beggar-Myself Policies
Thus far we have focused on theories of trade agreements that emphasize the control of beggar-
my-neighbor motives. A distinct though possibly complementary approach to the theory of trade
agreements can be developed if it is posited that the purpose of a trade agreement is to tie the hands
of its member governments against private agents in the economy, and thereby o⁄er an external
commitment device. This approach has been formalized in a number of papers (see, for example,
Carmichael, 1987, Staiger and Tabellini, 1987, Matsuyama, 1990, Brainard, 1994, Mitra , 2002 and
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998, 2007, to name a few).16 To describe the main ideas, we focus
on the papers of Maggi and Rodriquez-Clare.
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) adopt a small-country perspective so that the terms-of-
trade argument for trade agreements is absent, and they focus instead on the possibility that an
anticipated trade-policy-lobbying relationship between the government of this small country and
producers in one of its sectors could distort the equilibrium allocation of resources in the economy
16Regan (2006) also articulates a theory of trade agreements that seems to ￿t with this approach, although his
theory is somewhat informal and hence more di¢ cult to categorize with con￿dence.
12toward the sector with the active lobby. Working with the lobbying model of Grossman and
Helpman (1994), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare con￿rm that the government will be compensated
by the lobby for the ex-post distortions its trade-policy choice imposes on the economy, that is,
the distortions given the sectoral allocation of the economy￿ s resources that are sunk at the time
this choice is made. But the lobby will not compensate the government for the ex-ante distortions
in the sectoral allocation of resources created by the anticipation of the government￿ s relationship
with the lobby, and this provides an opening for the government to wish to tie its hands ex ante
against the possibility of being in￿ uenced by ex-post lobbying. As Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
demonstrate, a possible commitment role for a trade agreement is thereby identi￿ed.
In Maggi and Rodriquez-Clare (1998), the possibility of lobbying ex ante (i.e., at the time that
the decision to form a trade agreement is made) is not considered. In a follow-up paper, Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (2007) allow for this possibility, and develop a hybrid model that combines both
terms-of-trade and commitment arguments for a trade agreement. As they demonstrate, the two
motives for a trade agreement can interact in non-trivial ways and generate a number of interesting
empirical predictions. For example, the magnitude of trade liberalization delivered by a trade
agreement is expected to rise in the degree to which resources are mobile in and out of the sector
ex post. Intuitively, when resources are mobile ex post, the lobby correctly anticipates that the
rents from trade protection for its members will be low (they will be dissipated by entry into the
sector), and so the lobby is not willing ex ante to engage intensively against the formation of a
trade agreement that commits the government to low tari⁄s. And Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare also
demonstrate that their hybrid approach can help account for the particular form (ceilings) that
tari⁄ bindings take in the GATT/WTO.17
There is some empirical evidence that commitments made in trade agreements may play this
kind of role (see, for example, Staiger and Tabellini, 1999, and Tang and Wei, forthcoming). Never-
theless, as we noted in the Introduction, while the potential commitment role of trade agreements
has been identi￿ed and formalized in the literature, for the most part the literature adopting this ap-
proach has not attempted to understand and interpret the key design features of the GATT/WTO
from this perspective (though Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 2007, takes an important step in this
direction). For this reason, we do not focus on theories that view the purpose of trade agreements
as addressing beggar-myself policies for the remainder of our Review.
3 Terms-of-Trade Manipulation: The Evidence
What is the purpose of a trade agreement? As our discussion in the previous section has con￿rmed,
in a wide variety of formal settings the fundamental purpose of a trade agreement is to provide an
escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners￿Dilemma. Rarely in economics do so many distinct
models answer in unison to a single question, and the robust structure of the problem that is
implied by these models o⁄ers some hope that an institution with some simple design features
17Using models that feature the terms-of-trade externality, Bagwell and Staiger (2005b), Bagwell (2009) and Horn,
Maggi and Staiger (forthcoming) also provide interpretations of the use of tari⁄ ceilings in GATT/WTO.
13might e⁄ectively aid governments in their e⁄orts to ￿nd a solution. But there is also an alternative
view: these models may answer in unison, but the answer they provide is simply wrong, or at least
irrelevant to understanding the central features of trade agreements in general and the GATT/WTO
in particular. This, of course, is an empirical issue, and in this section we survey a growing body of
empirical work that provides evidence relating to the terms-of-trade argument. We focus here on
papers that relate to three speci￿c questions which we pose below, and which are directly related
to the essential features of the terms-of-trade argument. We postpone until section 5 a discussion
of a wider body of empirical work that relates to various predictions of the terms-of-trade theory.
A ￿rst question is whether there is evidence that a country￿ s tari⁄s can a⁄ect its terms of
trade, a clear pre-condition for the empirical relevance of the terms-of-trade theory. Studies by
Kreinin (1961), Winters and Chang (2000, 2002), Anderson and VanWincoop (2002) and Bown
and Crowley (2006), among others, o⁄er compelling evidence that unilateral tari⁄ changes can
signi￿cantly a⁄ect a country￿ s terms of trade, even for apparently ￿small￿countries such as Mexico.
Moreover, recalling that the terms-of-trade e⁄ects of a tari⁄ arise whenever the incidence of the
tari⁄ is not fully passed through to domestic prices, the large body of empirical work on exchange
rate pass-through surveyed by Goldberg and Knetter (1997) ￿when combined with the particular
empirical ￿ndings in Feenstra (1995) that the pass-through associated with exchange rate shocks
can be thought of as comparable in magnitude to the pass-through associated with tari⁄ changes
￿suggests that the terms-of-trade e⁄ects of tari⁄ changes are likely to be quantitatively signi￿cant
and widespread across countries.18
A second question is whether, when governments set their trade policies unilaterally (and hence
noncooperatively), they respond to terms-of-trade motives in the way that the theory predicts.
According to a recent paper by Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008), the answer is yes. Focusing
on 15 countries that were never GATT members, and that hence set their tari⁄s in a unilateral
fashion prior to joining the WTO, Broda et. al. ￿rst estimate the degree of market power that
each of these countries was able to exert on the foreign export (world) prices that it faced (as
captured by the foreign export supply elasticities faced by these countries). With these estimates,
they con￿rm the answer to the ￿rst question posed above that other studies have also provided:
most countries, even apparently ￿small￿countries, have signi￿cant ability to alter their terms of
trade on many imported products with their tari⁄ choices. Broda et. al. then relate this measure
of the power to a⁄ect world prices to the unilateral tari⁄ choices that each country made over this
period. They ￿nd that, prior to joining the WTO, these countries on average set tari⁄s 9 percentage
points higher on imports for which they could exert large e⁄ects on world prices as compared to
imports where their ability to a⁄ect world prices was limited, an impact that is very sizable (for
example, it is roughly comparable to the size of the average tari⁄s in these countries). Moreover,
they ￿nd that this terms-of-trade motive explains more of the cross-industry variation in tari⁄s
than is explained by commonly used political-economy variables. Hence, according to the Broda
18A more complete survey of the empirical literature relating to this ￿rst question is contained in Bagwell and
Staiger (2002b, Ch. 11).
14et. al. ￿ndings, when governments set their trade policies unilaterally and noncooperatively, they
respond to terms-of-trade motives strongly and in the way that the theory predicts.19
A third question is whether the tari⁄ cuts negotiated in the GATT/WTO actually re￿ ect the
removal of that portion of the noncooperative tari⁄ that embodies the terms-of-trade motive. One
way to answer this question is to check whether measures of the power to a⁄ect world prices help to
predict the levels of noncooperative trade policies but do not help predict the levels of tari⁄s bound
as a result of GATT/WTO negotiations. This is the approach taken by Broda et. al. (2008).
Focusing on the United States, they ￿nd that U.S. non-tari⁄ barriers and so-called ￿statutory
tari⁄ rates￿ ￿which have not been subjected to direct negotiations within the GATT/WTO ￿
are signi￿cantly and positively related to the degree of market power which the United States
exerts on the world prices of its import products, while the U.S. MFN tari⁄s ￿which have been
the subject of GATT/WTO negotiations ￿exhibit no such relationship. A di⁄erent approach to
this question is taken by Bagwell and Staiger (2009c). In that paper, the terms-of-trade theory
is used to derive an expression for the component of the noncooperative tari⁄ that embodies the
international cost-shifting motive, and this expression is in turn used to predict negotiated tari⁄
levels based on pre-negotiation tari⁄ levels, import volumes and prices, and measures of the power
to a⁄ect world prices. The implied pattern of negotiated tari⁄ cuts is then confronted with data
from the accession negotiations of 16 countries that joined the WTO subsequent to its creation
in 1995, and strong and robust support for the predictions of the terms-of-trade theory are found
in the observed pattern of negotiated tari⁄ concessions. When viewed together, these two papers
paint a reinforcing picture of an emerging message: there is increasing evidence consistent with the
view that the tari⁄cuts negotiated in the GATT/WTO re￿ ect the removal of trade protection that
is motivated by cost-shifting incentives, as the terms-of-trade theory predicts.
Finally, we note that the empirical relevance of the terms-of-trade theory does not hinge on
all countries being large enough to a⁄ect world prices in all products. Instead it simply suggests
that the large players in the market should be the most active participants in any particular
negotiation. When viewed from this perspective, the empirical pattern that is documented in the
studies surveyed above ￿that most countries have the power to a⁄ect their terms of trade in some
products, while some countries have the power to a⁄ect their terms of trade in most products ￿
seems broadly consistent with the record of tari⁄ bargaining in the GATT/WTO, namely, that
most of the participation in tari⁄ negotiations has come from the large industrial countries.
4 The GATT Architecture and its Historical Antecedents
GATT arose in response to the protectionist outbreak of the 1920s and 1930s, which culminated in
the U.S. Smoot-Hawley Tari⁄ Act of 1930 and the spate of retaliatory tari⁄s that followed. From
the perspective of our discussion above, we may think of the Nash equilibrium as corresponding to
the ￿tari⁄ war￿that is associated with the Smoot-Hawley tari⁄s. The challenge that governments
19These ￿ndings are reinforced by the recent paper of Dhingra (2009), who ￿nds cross-country empirical support
for the median-voter model of tari⁄ determination, but only once terms-of-trade motives are taken into account.
15faced was then to ￿nd some means to reach a more cooperative trade-policy relationship, and
thereby move to the contract curve.
4.1 Historical Antecedents
During the decade following World War I, the United States was involved in various multilateral
bargaining attempts to address the problem of high and rising tari⁄s, each largely unsuccessful
(Tasca, 1938, p 7). These repeated failures led to a conscious decision on the part of the United
States to abandon multilateral tari⁄ bargaining and experiment with bilateral bargaining under
the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA). The RTAA marked the ￿rst time that the
United States combined bilateral tari⁄ bargaining with unconditional MFN, according to which
exports from each country with whom the United States had an agreement under the RTAA would
automatically receive the lowest (￿most favored nation￿ ) tari⁄rate that the United States o⁄ered to
any exporting country.20 Though this approach was novel for the United States, similar approaches
had been tried in Europe decades earlier (Tasca, 1938, p. 135), and the design and implementation
of the RTAA built on lessons learned from the European experience with bilateral tari⁄ bargaining
in at least two important ways.
First, the European experience taught the important lesson that a country￿ s current bargaining
partners would require assurance that any future bilateral deals that it struck with other countries
would not erode the value of the concessions being granted, and that the most practical way to
provide assurance against such ￿concession erosion￿ was with a promise of unconditional MFN
(Wallace, 1933, p. 629). The promise of unconditional MFN was included in the RTAA in part to
address the concession erosion issue.21 Second, the European experience provided a vivid illustra-
tion of the perverse incentive to raise tari⁄s on the eve of bargaining ￿and thereby adopt so-called
￿bargaining tari⁄s￿￿to better position oneself for the negotiations to follow (Wallace, 1933, p.
630). As Tasca (1938, p. 179, note 34) observes, this experience provided a second lesson for the
United States, which for the purpose of measuring tari⁄ concessions in its bilateral negotiations
adopted the strategy of measuring all tari⁄s, on both sides, at a ￿xed pre-negotiation date.
These lessons may have helped the United States avoid the twin problems associated with
concession erosion and bargaining tari⁄s that plagued the European e⁄orts before it, and may
therefore help explain why bilateral tari⁄ bargaining under the RTAA turned out to be far more
successful. But while in the European experience the issue of bargaining tari⁄s amounted to the
unilateral positioning of pre-negotiation tari⁄s, under the RTAA the analogous issue became how
to design bilateral agreements with early negotiating partners to best preserve bargaining power for
later agreements with other negotiating partners. This task was made di¢ cult by the unconditional
MFN requirement, which automatically granted ￿for free￿to other potential bargaining partners
20As Tasca (1938, pp. 116-121) describes, the United States had, since 1922, adopted an unconditional MFN
approach, but maintained an ￿autonomous￿(i.e., unilateral) tari⁄ up until the RTAA.
21There were also wider arguments for adopting a policy of unconditional MFN, including the perceived ￿multi-
lateralization￿bene￿ts and a reduction in the risk of war emphasized by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the
time (see, for example, Culbert, 1987 and Rhodes, 1993).
16any tari⁄ concessions granted to early negotiating partners.
The preservation of bargaining power for later negotiations became a major preoccupation of
the United States under the RTAA. Beckett (1941, p. 23) and Tasca (1938, pp. 146-147) discuss
the tactics used by the United States under the RTAA in this regard. In e⁄ect, by granting
tari⁄ concessions to a negotiating partner only on those products for which the partner was the
principal supplier, possibly combined with product reclassi￿cation for tari⁄ purposes to heighten
the dominance of the partner in these products, and by splitting the concession into a sequence of
partial tari⁄reductions negotiated with di⁄erent countries in successive agreements, it was thought
that much of the free-rider potential created by unconditional MFN could be eliminated. And where
free-riding remained a substantial possibility, two additional tactics were available: attempting to
engage groups of countries in simultaneous negotiations; and threatening to withdraw or modify
the earlier agreement if free-riding continued.
Summarizing, tari⁄ bargaining under the RTAA exhibited a number of central features: the
approach to tari⁄ bargaining was decidedly bilateral, and was chosen only after governments had
considered, attempted, and ultimately rejected multilateral tari⁄ bargaining; prior European ex-
perience with concession erosion and bargaining tari⁄s were at the heart of prominent issues that
in￿ uenced the design and implementation of the RTAA along important dimensions; and uncon-
ditional MFN, the principal-supplier rule, split concessions and withdrawal/modi￿cation clauses
were understood to be central to the operation of reciprocal tari⁄ bargaining under the RTAA.
Between 1934 and 1947, the United States successfully concluded separate bilateral agreements
with 29 countries under the RTAA. Encouraged by this success, the United States pushed for the
establishment of a multilateral institution built upon the key components of the RTAA, and in
1946 formal negotiations began for the creation of an International Trade Organization (ITO). In
1947, GATT was negotiated and was intended to serve as an interim agreement, but the ITO was
never rati￿ed by the U.S. Congress.
The objectives of the member governments in creating GATT are described in its Preamble, and
include ￿expanding the production and exchange of goods.￿The Preamble also states the govern-
ments￿belief that ￿reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction in tari⁄s and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment
in international commerce￿would contribute toward these objectives.
In total, there were eight rounds of GATT negotiations that together spanned almost 50 years.
In the earlier rounds, the primary focus was the reduction of import tari⁄s on goods. In the ￿nal
GATT round, known as the Uruguay Round, governments took on a number of new issues (e.g.,
investment and intellectual property) and formed the WTO. The WTO has sponsored a ninth
round, the Doha Round, that is still ongoing.
4.2 Architecture
Membership in the GATT/WTO carries with it an obligation to abide by certain rules. In GATT,
these rules were contained in a set of 39 articles. These GATT articles have been incorporated into
17the WTO, and the WTO has also extended the principles embodied in them to a variety of new
issues. Here, we provide a brief overview of the principles embodied in these articles.
GATT articles can be sorted into three broad categories: substantive obligations, exceptions to
those obligations, and dispute settlement procedures. The substantive obligations of a GATT/WTO
member relate to tari⁄ commitments, MFN treatment and a general ￿code of conduct￿ in the
international-trade arena. These provisions oblige member-governments to use tari⁄s rather than
non-tari⁄ barriers as protective measures, to apply them on a non-discriminatory basis to other
members, and to honor any tari⁄ bindings made in a GATT/WTO negotiation.
At the same time, the GATT/WTO also provides for a variety of exceptions to these obligations.
Some exceptions permit a government to suspend an obligation under certain conditions or to
withdraw a previous concession through renegotiation. The logic of including exceptions for such
￿original￿actions is that a government is more likely to agree to a tari⁄ commitment if it knows
that the legal system has ￿safeguards￿allowing its concessions to be modi￿ed or withdrawn under
appropriate conditions. But a tari⁄ commitment would lose its meaning if exceptions for original
actions were not disciplined in some way, and so GATT/WTO rules also permit exceptions for
￿retaliatory￿actions. Speci￿cally, if a government modi￿es or withdraws a previous concession,
then GATT/WTO rules recognize that a cost may be borne by its trading partner; and if the
government fails to compensate the trading partner in an amount that is acceptable to the trading
partner, then the partner is allowed to achieve compensation through retaliation. The meaning of
retaliation is that the trading partner can withdraw a concession of a ￿substantially equivalent￿
nature.
We now come to the third element mentioned above: the GATT/WTO dispute settlement
procedures. Here a key issue is the determination of whether the actions by one country ￿nullify or
impair￿the bene￿ts that another country expects under the agreement. This occurs when actions
are taken by one country which ￿...harmed the trade of another, and which ￿ could not reasonably
have been anticipated￿by the other at the time it negotiated for a concession￿(Jackson, 1997, p.
115). In the typical complaint, a country is alleged to have failed to comply with its GATT/WTO
obligations, as when it imposes quantitative restrictions or violates MFN.22
Every GATT/WTO dispute begins with a consultation phase among the involved parties. Res-
olution of the dispute may be (and often is) achieved in this ￿rst phase. Otherwise, a second
phase is initiated in which a GATT/WTO panel (or Appellate Body) conducts an investigation
and issues a ruling and recommendation. If the panel ￿nds that nulli￿cation or impairment has
occurred, then it recommends that the o⁄ending country correct any illegal measures, and resolu-
tion of the dispute may occur at this point. The o⁄ending country may be unwilling to comply
with the panel￿ s recommendation, however, and in this case it might seek a negotiated resolution
by o⁄ering to compensate the harmed country, perhaps in the form of an MFN tari⁄ reduction on
some other good. But if compensation is not o⁄ered, or if it is o⁄ered but rejected, the harmed
22See Hudec (1993) and Bown (2002) for a description of the trade disputes that occurred under GATT, and see
Horn and Mavroidis (2001-2007) for legal and economic analyses of the major disputes under the WTO.
18country may then retaliate with an authorized and discriminatory suspension of tari⁄ concessions.
The number of authorized retaliations has in practice been small, but as Rhodes (1993, p. 109)
observes, the threat of authorized retaliation is often the catalyst for resolution in the earlier phases
of the dispute.23
As our discussion in this section con￿rms, MFN is a pillar of the GATT/WTO architecture, and
the enforcement provisions of the GATT/WTO are elaborately developed. The representation of
reciprocity in the GATT/WTO, however, may be less apparent from this discussion. We therefore
comment brie￿ y on the role of reciprocity in the GATT/WTO.
The GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity refers to the ideal of mutual changes in trade policy
which bring about changes in the volume of each country￿ s imports that are of equal value to changes
in the volume of its exports. In our discussion above, the notion of reciprocity arises in two places.
First, as we have observed, governments negotiate in GATT/WTO rounds with the stated goal
of obtaining mutually advantageous arrangements through reciprocal reductions in tari⁄ bindings:
in this context, it is often observed that governments approach negotiations seeking a ￿balance of
concessions,￿ so that there is a rough equivalence between the market access value of the tari⁄
cuts o⁄ered by one government and the concessions won from its trading partner. Second, when
a government seeks to renegotiate and modi￿es or withdraws a previous concession as an original
action, and more generally whenever a government takes an action which nulli￿es or impairs the
bene￿ts expected under the agreement by another government, GATT/WTO rules permit a⁄ected
trading partners to withdraw ￿substantially equivalent concessions,￿and thereby to retaliate in a
reciprocal manner.
5 The Design and Practice of the GATT/WTO: A View from the
Terms-of-Trade Theory
We now turn to the fourth and ￿nal step in our Review. Here we draw on the recent theoretical
and empirical literature to interpret the design and practice of the GATT/WTO. We begin with
the principle of reciprocity.
5.1 Reciprocity
We have suggested above that the central problem faced by governments as they considered the
design of the GATT/WTO can be given a simple interpretation: terms-of-trade manipulation.
From this vantage point, we may now pose the question: Why would the principle of reciprocity
be attractive to governments? The answer is that reciprocity describes a ￿xed-terms-of-trade
rule to which mutual tari⁄ changes must conform; and in an environment where terms-of-trade
manipulation is the problem to be ￿xed, a ￿xed-terms-of-trade rule is bound to be attractive.
23Under GATT, retaliation was authorized only once. Under the WTO, retaliation has been authorized and used
in a number of cases. See Mavroidis (2000) and WTO (2001, p. 28) for further discussion.
19We now explain these points more fully.24 We ￿rst propose a formal de￿nition of reciprocity.
Suppose that, beginning from an initial pair of tari⁄s, (￿0;￿￿0), a tari⁄ negotiation results in a
change to the new pair of tari⁄s, (￿1;￿￿1): Denoting the initial world and domestic local prices
as e pw0 ￿ e pw(￿0;￿￿0) and p0 ￿ p(￿0; e pw0), and the new world and domestic local prices as e pw1 ￿
e pw(￿1;￿￿1) and p1 ￿ p(￿1; e pw1), we say that the tari⁄changes conform to the principle of reciprocity
provided that
e pw0[Mx(p1; e pw1) ￿ Mx(p0; e pw0)] = [Ey(p1; e pw1) ￿ Ey(p0; e pw0)]; (7)
where changes in trade volumes are valued at the existing world price.25 We next use the balanced
trade condition (1) ￿which must hold at both the initial tari⁄s and the new tari⁄s ￿to establish
that (7) may be rewritten as
[e pw1 ￿ e pw0]Mx(p1; e pw1) = 0: (8)
According to (8), reciprocity can be given a simple and striking characterization: mutual changes
in trade policy conform to the principle of reciprocity if and only if they leave the world price
unchanged. With this characterization in hand, we now consider the application of reciprocity
within GATT/WTO practice.
As we have noted above, a ￿rst application of reciprocity refers to the balance of concessions
that governments seek through a negotiated agreement. Such behavior is hard to reconcile with
the standard economic argument that unilateral free trade is in a country￿ s best interests. The
terms-of-trade theory, however, o⁄ers a simple interpretation of this application of reciprocity.
To see this, suppose that governments begin with Nash tari⁄s, and observe that, at the Nash
point, we may use (4), (5) and (6) to conclude that Wp < 0 < W￿
p￿. Next observe that, if
governments were to reduce tari⁄s in a reciprocal manner, then according to (8) the world price
would be preserved, while the domestic local price p would fall and the foreign local price p￿
would rise. But this means that both the domestic-government welfare and the foreign-government
welfare would then rise (since Wp < 0 and W￿
p￿ > 0). Evidently, the structure of international
cost-shifting implies that, beginning from their Nash tari⁄ choices, both governments would desire
tari⁄liberalization and the implied greater trade volume if this could be achieved without a decline
in the terms of trade. The principle of reciprocity harnesses this desire, and so activates e¢ ciency-
enhancing tari⁄-liberalizing forces in this environment.
As we have noted, a second application of reciprocity in the GATT/WTO arises whenever a
government takes an action which nulli￿es or impairs the bene￿ts expected under the agreement
by another government. An important instance of this second application concerns the rules that
govern the process by which tari⁄ bindings may be renegotiated. Under GATT Article XXVIII,
24See Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) where these results are derived formally.
25This de￿nes reciprocity from the perspective of the domestic country. But in our two-country setting, tari⁄
changes conform to reciprocity for the domestic country if and only if they conform to reciprocity for the foreign
country as well.
20a country may propose to modify or withdraw a concession agreed upon in a previous round of
negotiation, and may o⁄er some compensation to its trading partner in return. But if the country
and its trading partner are unable to reach agreement on the appropriate level of compensation,
the country is permitted to implement its proposed change anyway, with the understanding that
the trading partner may then reciprocate. Here, the principle of reciprocity is used to moderate the
response of the trading partner, who is allowed to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions of
its own.
In light of the explicit provisions governing renegotiation, market-access negotiations in the
GATT/WTO may be viewed as a multi-stage game. Governments ￿rst agree to bind their tari⁄s
at speci￿c levels in a round of negotiations. And then each government considers whether it would
prefer to raise its tari⁄ above the bound level, anticipating that the outcome of any renegotiation
will conform to reciprocity, preserving the balance struck by the original negotiations and thus
preserving the world price. In this setting, a pair of initially negotiated tari⁄s will be renegotiated
if, at the initial tari⁄ pair, either government desires less trade volume and the associated change
in its local price at the ￿xed world price. This suggests that many points on the e¢ ciency frontier
could be susceptible to renegotiation in this setting. In fact, there is only one e¢ cient tari⁄ pair
that is robust to the possibility of renegotiation under the reciprocity rule, and that is the politically
optimal tari⁄ pair. If governments were to negotiate to the e¢ cient political optimum, where each
government has achieved its preferred local price, then neither government would have any desire
to deviate from this point if in so doing it could not alter the terms of trade in its favor. The
principle of reciprocity in this second application can be understood to harness this feature, and
so to create an environment where the e¢ cient political optimum, once achieved, remains a robust
and stable outcome.
This discussion also reveals a broader point: in e⁄ect, governments are ￿penalized￿under the
GATT/WTO reciprocity rule if they attempt to negotiate an e¢ cient tari⁄ pair other than the
political optimum. Suppose, for example, that the domestic government is successful in pushing
the initial negotiations to a point on the e¢ ciency frontier which is more favorable to it than the
political optimum. At the political optimum, the domestic government￿ s welfare cannot be enhanced
with a change in its local price, so at this alternative preferred point the terms of trade must be
more favorable for the domestic government than the terms of trade at the political optimum;
and by implication, the terms of trade must then be less favorable for the foreign government
at this alternative point relative to the political optimum. Notice, though, that if the initial
negotiations lead to this alternative point, then at the ￿xed but less-favorable terms of trade
the foreign government will naturally want less trade volume (and the associated change in its
local price) as compared to the political optimum, and the foreign government can achieve this
through renegotiation. Therefore, some of the bene￿t to the domestic government of pushing the
initial negotiating point away from the political optimum would be given up in the subsequent
renegotiation. And as a result, the domestic government may be less eager to push negotiations
away from the political optimum in the ￿rst place. As this example illustrates, the reciprocity
21rule can help to mitigate the power asymmetries that governments might otherwise display at the
bargaining table. In this way, it encourages governments to select the ￿rules-based￿ politically
optimal tari⁄s.
Recent empirical evidence con￿rms the importance of the ￿rst GATT/WTO application of
reciprocity discussed above. For example, Shirono (2004) ￿nds that the tari⁄ cuts agreed to in
the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations conformed closely to the reciprocity norm, and that
the economic signi￿cance of the terms-of-trade changes induced by these tari⁄ cuts were quite
limited. Limao (2006, 2007) also ￿nds evidence consistent with reciprocity. In particular, focusing
on U.S. tari⁄ cuts in the Uruguay Round and constructing a measure of market-access concessions
while instrumenting to address the potential endogeneity issues, Limao reports that a decrease in
the tari⁄ of a U.S. trading partner that exports a given product leads to a decrease in the U.S.
tari⁄ on that product, and that a signi￿cant determinant of cross￿ product variation in U.S. tari⁄
liberalization is the degree to which the United States received reciprocal market-access concessions
from the corresponding exporting countries. Finally, Karacaovali and Limao (2008) perform a
similar exercise for the EU tari⁄ cutting behavior in the Uruguay Round, and ￿nd analogous
support for the importance of reciprocity in explaining the pattern of EU tari⁄ cuts: EU tari⁄
reductions were largest for those products exported by countries who themselves granted large
reductions in tari⁄s. While more evidence is needed before the issue is settled, as an empirical
matter it does appear that actual tari⁄ bargaining outcomes in the GATT/WTO conform to a
reciprocity norm.
Regarding the second application of reciprocity in the GATT/WTO, the empirical questions
at issue are somewhat di⁄erent. It is clear as a legal matter that in this application reciprocity
in the GATT/WTO is de￿ned by equivalent trade e⁄ects, much as the de￿nition in (7) indicates,
and that in practice this concept guides the permissible response to nulli￿cation or impairment in
the GATT/WTO.26 What is less clear is whether the principle of reciprocity in this application
serves to guide governments toward a rules-based outcome such as the political optimum. On the
one hand, some features of the political optimum seem to be present in GATT/WTO conventions
and bargaining outcomes: the principal-supplier rule creates a presumption that small players in
a market will typically not be asked by their trading partners to make signi￿cant market-access
concessions in that market; special and di⁄erential treatment clauses exempt many small countries
from a host of other GATT/WTO obligations to which other countries must conform; most of the
signi￿cant market-access concessions have been made by the large industrialized countries; and even
where a country that is small in a given market accepts on paper obligations that apply to that
market, the GATT/WTO enforcement procedures operate ￿on demand,￿ and so a small player
in a market can likely expect to be able to violate obligations in that market without bringing
retaliation upon itself in any event. On the other hand, there are many accounts from diplomats
26See, for example, the Appellate Body Opinion in WTO (2004) on the trade-e⁄ects interpretation of reciprocity.
While it is clear that the trade-e⁄ects concept of reciprocity applies in this context, there is still the implementa-
tion issue of how trade e⁄ects are assessed, and a remaining question is whether the trade-e⁄ects approach can be
implemented in a meaningful way (see, for example, Spamann, 2006).
22and delegates of small and developing countries that run counter to this view.27 In any event, this
is a critical question, both for the theory and for the policy debate surrounding the performance of
the WTO. And to date we are unaware of any empirical work that directly addresses it.
5.2 MFN
We next turn to the nondiscrimination principle, embodied in the GATT/WTO rule that requires
all tari⁄s to be applied on an MFN basis to the trade of other member countries. To begin, we
describe a 3-country extension of the benchmark general-equilibrium model developed in section
2.1.1.
The domestic country now exports good y to two foreign countries, denoted by the superscripts
￿ ￿1￿and ￿ ￿2,￿and imports good x from each of these countries (who do not trade with each other).
Each foreign country can impose a tari⁄ on its imports of good y from the domestic country (we
denote the tari⁄ of foreign-country i by ￿￿i), while the domestic country can set tari⁄s on its
imports of good x from the two foreign countries. Notice that if the domestic country applies the
tari⁄ ￿1 to imports from foreign-country 1 and the discriminatory tari⁄ ￿2 6= ￿1 to imports from
foreign-country 2, then separate world prices pw1 and pw2 apply to its trade with foreign-countries 1
and 2 respectively: this follows because there can only be one local price in the domestic economy,
and the pricing relationships p = ￿1pw1 and p = ￿2pw2 then imply pw1 6= pw2 whenever ￿1 6= ￿2.
In this setting, the MFN rule imposes a very simple requirement: the domestic country must
apply a common tari⁄ level ￿1 = ￿2 ￿ ￿ to the imports of x, regardless of whether these imports
originate from foreign-country 1 or 2. An important implication of the MFN rule is then that a single
equilibrium world price, e pw(￿;￿￿1;￿￿2), must prevail; consequently, we may continue to express
government preferences with the simple representation W(p; e pw), W￿1(p￿1; e pw) and W￿2(p￿2; e pw),
the same representation that we used in the 2-country setting.
At a basic level, the appeal of the MFN principle can already be appreciated: in a multilateral
world, the MFN principle ensures that the international externality at the root of the problem to be
solved continues to exhibit the same structure as in the simpler 2-country setting. This suggests in
turn that, in the company of MFN, the attractive properties of reciprocity described above might
extend to a multilateral setting. This is indeed the case. Under the MFN principle and beginning
from noncooperative tari⁄s, each country can gain from reciprocal liberalization; and MFN polit-
ically optimal tari⁄s (which are e¢ cient) are robust to renegotiation under the reciprocity rule.
And in light of our earlier discussion, in a multilateral world MFN and reciprocity together may be
understood as encouraging governments to select the politically optimal tari⁄s, thereby mitigating
the power asymmetries that governments might otherwise wield at the bargaining table.28
27See, for example, Jawara and Kwa (2003) and the review of Jawara and Kwa in Staiger (2006).
28These results are established in Bagwell and Staiger (1999a), where it is also established that neither reciprocity
nor MFN can by itself exhibit these features in a many-country setting. McCalman (2002) o⁄ers a di⁄erent formal-
ization of the bene￿ts of the MFN rule. In the setting he considers, informational asymmetries play a central role,
and provided that the number of small countries is su¢ ciently great, a large country has diminished capacity under
the MFN rule to hold an agreement hostage and extract rents from its small trading partners, enhancing both global
e¢ ciency and the payo⁄s of small countries. Other implications of the MFN rule are explored in Choi (1995), Ludema
23But new issues also arise in a many-country world that are themselves related to the adoption of
the MFN principle. One issue concerns concession erosion: as discussed in section 4, in anticipation
that trade liberalization would proceed according to a sequence of bilateral negotiations, the MFN
principle was included in the RTAA and subsequently in the GATT/WTO in part to address
this issue. Another issue involves bargaining tari⁄s: in the presence of the MFN principle it was
feared that free-riding and the implied loss of bargaining power could become a serious obstacle to
successful negotiations, as discussed in section 4 as well. At the heart of these issues is a common
theme: when countries engage in bilateral tari⁄ bargaining, how can third-country spillovers be
minimized?
Strikingly, the twin pillars of MFN and reciprocity can be understood as minimizing third-
country spillovers from bilateral tari⁄ bargaining.29 To see why, consider the case where foreign-
country 2 is not involved in the negotiations and keeps its tari⁄unaltered. In the presence of MFN,
the domestic government and the government of foreign-country 1 can still negotiate a recipro-
cal reduction in their respective tari⁄s ￿ and ￿￿1 which leaves the terms of trade e pw(￿;￿￿1;￿￿2)
unaltered but reduces p while raising p￿1, and which therefore provides these two countries with
greater trade volume. But recall now that in foreign-country 2 we have the pricing relationship
p￿2 = pw=￿￿2. It follows that, with ￿￿2 held ￿xed, if the negotiation between the domestic country
and foreign-country 1 abides by MFN (so that a single equilibrium world price e pw prevails) and
reciprocity (so that e pw is unaltered) then p￿2 and therefore W￿2(p￿2; e pw) and foreign-country 2￿ s
trade volume are unaltered by these negotiations as well. In abiding by the principles of MFN and
reciprocity, the domestic government and the government of foreign-country 1 have thus engineered
a bilateral tari⁄ bargain without third-country spillovers.
How can it be that exporters from foreign-country 2 experience a reduced MFN tari⁄ from the
domestic country and yet do not enjoy any increase in their export volume? The reason is that
these exporters compete for sales in the domestic market with exporters from foreign-country 1,
and exporters from foreign-country 1 become more competitive due to the negotiated reduction
in foreign-country 1￿ s import tari⁄, which releases productive resources from foreign-country 1￿ s
import-competing sector and allows these resources to move into foreign-country 1￿ s export sector.
It is also interesting to observe that MFN by itself is not enough to accomplish this feat. This
can be seen by noting that a non-reciprocal negotiation between the domestic country and foreign-
country 1 could also be undertaken in the presence of MFN, but such a negotiation would alter e pw
and hence (with ￿￿2 held ￿xed) alter p￿2 and therefore in general alter W￿2(p￿2; e pw) and foreign-
country 2￿ s trade volume. This suggests a quali￿cation to the position that is sometimes taken
in the literature that the MFN principle is by itself su¢ cient to eliminate the risk of concession
erosion.30
The preceding discussion leads to an important insight: the MFN rule permits the liberalizing
force of reciprocity to be harnessed in an essentially bilateral manner even in a multilateral world.
(1991) and Saggi (2004).
29These and related points are developed in Bagwell and Staiger (2005a, 2007).
30This position is suggested by Schwartz and Sykes (1997) and Ethier (2004).
24This means that, at least in principle, countries can negotiate split concessions with a sequence of
trading partners who need not fear that those concessions will be eroded by later bargains, as long
as the bargains abide by the principles of MFN and reciprocity; and where strict reciprocity is not
feasible (and hence some spillovers become inevitable), ordering this sequence in accordance with
the principal-supplier rule and under the threat of modi￿cation or withdrawal can help preserve
a country￿ s bargaining power along the way. This describes a negotiating forum and a set of
bargaining tactics that broadly mirror those anticipated from the U.S. experience with the RTAA.31
Are these features borne out in GATT/WTO practice? The existing evidence takes two forms.
One form concerns the trade-volume impacts associated with GATT/WTO membership. Accord-
ing to the ￿ndings of Subramanian and Wei (2008), GATT/WTO membership is associated with
a large and signi￿cant increase in trade volumes for developed countries, but developing-country
members experience a weak or non-existent impact on their trade volumes. Given that developed
countries have been the main participants in GATT/WTO sponsored tari⁄ bargaining while devel-
oping countries have been largely inactive in this capacity, the ￿ndings of Subramanian and Wei
are broadly consistent with the interpretation that the participants in GATT/WTO tari⁄ bargain-
ing have successfully neutralized signi￿cant third-country spillovers.32 Of course, an alternative
interpretation is that developed countries have simply found ways around the MFN principle, and
have in their tari⁄ bargaining discriminated against non-participating GATT/WTO members. A
paper whose ￿ndings weigh against this alternative interpretation is Bown (2004a). In the context
of GATT/WTO bilateral dispute settlement negotiations at least, Bown ￿nds that countries do
indeed abide by the MFN principle.
This ￿rst form of evidence is therefore suggestive, but it is far from conclusive. An interesting
avenue for further exploration would be to draw a tighter link between the trade e⁄ects experienced
by GATT/WTO members and their negotiated tari⁄ commitments. For example, according to the
logic of the discussion above, if GATT/WTO bargains stick closely to the MFN and reciprocity
principles, it is a country￿ s own liberalization relative to that of competing exporters, more than
the liberalization in the markets to which it exports, that should be decisive in determining the
trade e⁄ects it experiences from GATT/WTO membership.
A second form of evidence looks directly at the pattern of tari⁄ bindings negotiated in the
GATT/WTO, and seeks to uncover possible evidence of free riding and its impacts on bargaining
outcomes. Ludema and Mayda (2007, and forthcoming) relate the expected severity of the MFN
free-rider problem to a Her￿ndahl index of the concentration of foreign exporters into a given
country￿ s markets, interacted with cross-country variation in the foreign export supply elasticities
faced by a given country to re￿ ect its power over the terms of trade. Using this relationship,
31These points are developed formally in Bagwell and Staiger (2007).
32In fact, in a provocative paper, Rose (2004) reports ￿nding no signi￿cant trade-volume impact of GATT/WTO
membership whatsoever, but Rose fails to allow for a di⁄erential impact across countries. As the ￿ndings of Subra-
manian and Wei (2008) con￿rm, and as the theory we have discussed implies, allowing for di⁄erential trade-volume
impacts based on di⁄erent levels of bargaining participation is crucial for understanding the impacts of GATT/WTO
membership. See also Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007) who argue that Rose￿ s results are overturned when a more
complete de￿nition of GATT membership is employed.
25they ￿nd evidence of free riding in the tari⁄ bargaining that occurs in GATT/WTO negotiating
rounds, and suggest that the impact of this free riding on GATT/WTO tari⁄ bargaining outcomes
could be substantial. Using the relationship developed by Ludema and Mayda, Bagwell and Staiger
(2009c) explore the possibility of a free-rider problem in the context of accession negotiations in the
WTO, and ￿nd little evidence of a free-rider problem in that setting. The approach of Ludema and
Mayda is developed to get around the lack of available data on the actual participants in any given
GATT/WTO tari⁄bargain. Detailed bargaining records do exist, however, and if made available to
researchers they could provide a valuable tool for further empirical work on this important question.
Finally, one might wonder whether the fear of concession erosion remains a powerful force in
determining GATT/WTO bargaining outcomes. This question takes on special relevance, because
the MFN principle is a central means by which the fear of concession erosion was to be allayed,
and yet exceptions to the MFN principle under GATT Article XXIV have been widely exercised
by governments for the purpose of forming preferential agreements. Here we simply observe that
the fear of concession erosion may have been replaced by the related fear of ￿preference erosion,￿
which can also become a powerful force ￿a ￿stumbling block￿in Bhagwati￿ s (1991) terminology ￿
against further MFN tari⁄ reductions. Support for this position is provided in Limao (2006, 2007)
and Karacaovali and Limao (2008), who model the interaction between preferential and multilateral
negotiations and ￿nd evidence for a signi￿cant stumbling-block e⁄ect of the preferential agreements
negotiated by the United States and the EU, driven by the incentive of U.S. and EU preferential
partners to stop the preference erosion that further U.S. and EU MFN tari⁄ liberalization would
imply.33
5.3 Enforcement and Dispute Settlement Procedures
As we discussed in section 4.2, membership in the GATT/WTO carries with it an obligation to
abide by a set of rules. But how are these rules enforced? After all, if under the rules governments
manage to negotiate from the Nash point to a point on the contract curve, such as the political
optimum, the temptation will be substantial for a government to unilaterally select a high tari⁄and
shift costs, and this temptation does not go away simply because an agreement is signed. Rather,
as there is no ￿world jail￿into which government leaders are thrown if they violate GATT/WTO
rules, an e⁄ective GATT/WTO must ensure that such temptations to deviate from the agreement
are balanced against the anticipated costs of the retaliatory response by other governments that the
deviation would provoke. That is, if it is to be e⁄ective, the GATT/WTO must be ￿self-enforcing.￿
As emphasized more generally by McMillan (1986, 1989), Dixit (1987) and Bagwell and Staiger
(1990) among others, the enforcement issues that are associated with trade agreements may be
33We note, though, that this incentive is not always the dominant force determining the impact of preferential
agreements on MFN tari⁄s: focusing on a set of developing countries whose MFN tari⁄s are relatively high, Este-
vadordal, Freund and Ornelas (2008) ￿nd that membership in a free-trade agreement leads to a reduction in MFN
tari⁄s of the member countries, possibly re￿ ecting the stronger ￿tari⁄-complementarity￿e⁄ects that arises when MFN
tari⁄s are high (on the tari⁄-complementarity e⁄ect, see Bagwell and Staiger, 1999b, Freund, 2000, and Ornelas, 2005
and 2007). Freund and Ornelas (forthcoming) survey the literature on preferential agreements and their relationship
to the GATT/WTO more broadly.
26analyzed using the theory of repeated games, and a large literature has emerged on this topic.34
Here we emphasize just three points.
First, the repeated-game perspective is broadly consistent with the GATT/WTO enforcement
provisions as described in section 4.2. In particular, as we have indicated, the creation of the
GATT/WTO and its nulli￿cation-or-impairment procedures may be viewed as an attempt to re-
place the Nash outcome with a more e¢ cient equilibrium outcome. To accomplish this, govern-
ments agreed to limit the use of retaliation along the equilibrium path and reposition it as an
o⁄-equilibrium-path threat that enforces the rules. This view is well-captured in a statement by
one of the drafters of GATT￿ s nulli￿cation-or-impairment clause (as quoted in Petersmann, 1997,
p. 83):
We have asked the nations of the world to confer upon an international organization
the right to limit their power to retaliate. We have sought to tame retaliation, to
discipline it, to keep it within bounds. By subjecting it to the restraints of international
control, we have endeavored to check its spread and growth, to convert it from a weapon
of economic warfare to an instrument of international order.
It should be stressed that there have been numerous GATT/WTO disputes whose resolution has
entailed some form of policy response by the disputants, either in the form of explicit, authorized
retaliation (rarely in GATT, more often in the WTO) or in the form of a settlement agreement
reached in the ￿shadow￿of authorized retaliation or its anticipation (the majority of GATT/WTO
cases), and so a limited role for retaliation on the equilibrium path does arise in the GATT/WTO.
But from the perspective of the theory of repeated games, this on-equilibrium-path retaliation can
be interpreted as adjustments to the bargain that are made in response to shocks which would
otherwise upset the balance between the temptation to deviate from the bargain and the costs of
the penalty for deviation. Consistent with the theory of repeated games, it is this penalty, which
could amount to a breakdown of the entire GATT/WTO system and a return to a Nash ￿trade
war,￿and which is the ultimate threat that maintains the international order, that remains o⁄ the
equilibrium path.35
A second point is the special challenge that smaller countries face in ensuring that their rights
are enforced in the GATT/WTO, given that enforcement depends importantly on the ability to
retaliate.36 This issue has particular relevance for developing country members, who as Hudec
(2000) recounts ￿rst put forward a proposal on GATT remedies in 1965 suggesting that ￿collective
retaliation￿be permitted in cases where a large country violated its obligations to a developing
34Recent theoretical papers include Atur (2009), Bagwell (2009), Bagwell and Staiger (2003, 2005b), Beshkar
(2009), Bond and Park (2002), Chisik (2003), Ederington (2001), Klimenko, Ramey and Watson (2008), Lee (2007),
Limao (2005), Limao and Saggi (forthcoming), Martin and Vergote (2008), Park (2009) and Zissimos (2006). Related
empirical work includes Prusa and Skeath (2001) and Blonigen and Bown (2003).
35See Bagwell and Staiger (2002b, Ch. 6) for a more extensive discussion of the relationship between retaliation in
GATT/WTO and the theory of repeated games.
36See Park (2000) for an analysis of enforcement issues that arise between a small and a large country, and Bown
(2004b,c) for evidence on the important e⁄ect that the ability to retaliate has on the resolution of GATT/WTO
disputes.
27country. This raises the interesting question whether permitting multilateral retaliation in the
context of a bilateral dispute is warranted in some circumstances. On the one hand, as the quotation
above suggests, an important purpose of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures is to
restrain retaliation and ￿check its spread and growth,￿and any move toward multilateral retaliation
would clearly go against this purpose. On the other hand, it is di¢ cult to see how smaller countries
could attain equal footing in a GATT/WTO dispute with their large trading partners without the
aid of multilateral retaliation in some form. More recently, Mexico has proposed in the ongoing
Doha Round a number of changes to the dispute settlement procedures, among them a variation
on the idea of multilateral retaliation according to which the right of retaliation would be made
￿tradeable￿(see WTO, 2002). Maggi (1999) provides a theoretical framework for understanding
the potential bene￿ts of multilateral retaliation, and there has been some recent attention to this
issue stimulated by the Mexican proposal.37 But the relevant questions pertaining to this important
issue have just begun to be explored.
Finally, while the literature discussed above interprets disputes as fundamentally about enforce-
ment, many GATT/WTO disputes seem to be at least as much about interpreting vague clauses in
the agreement or ￿lling gaps where the agreement is simply silent. Moreover, some of the most in-
tense debates about the design of the dispute settlement procedures concern the appropriate degree
of ￿activism￿(see, for example, Goldstein and Steinberg, 2007): Should WTO panels be allowed to
engage in ￿judicial lawmaking,￿or should they be constrained to rule only on the obligations that
are clearly stated in the agreement? Formal analysis of these issues requires that the contractual
incompleteness of the GATT/WTO be placed at center stage, and while recent work has begun to
explore these issues, such analysis is still in its infancy.38
6 Conclusion
We have surveyed recent economic research that attempts to understand and interpret the design
and practice of the GATT/WTO. Our Review has focused on three of the most central features of
the GATT/WTO ￿reciprocity, non-discrimination and enforcement/dispute settlement ￿but we
have left out a number of other active areas of research. We conclude by mentioning two.
A ￿rst area is the treatment of non-border measures in the GATT/WTO. In our discussion
above, we feature a simple setting in which governments negotiate restrictions on import tari⁄s
alone. Of course, in reality, governments select domestic or non-border policies as well, and these
policies may also impact trade ￿ ows. As emphasized in much recent research, an e¢ cient trade
agreement must also restrict governments from using domestic policies to favor import-competing
￿rms. For example, an e¢ cient agreement must place restrictions on the ability of governments
37See, for example, the analysis of auctioning retaliation rights in Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2007), and the
analysis of the exchange of bonds as an enforcement mechanism in Limao and Saggi (2008).
38A recent paper by Horn, Maggi and Staiger (forthcoming) builds on the writing-costs approach of Battigalli and
Maggi (2002) to develop a theory of trade agreements as endogenously incomplete contracts, but that paper does
not consider the role of dispute settlement procedures. A paper that does consider the role of dispute settlement
procedures in a related incomplete-contracts setting is Maggi and Staiger (2008).
28to undermine negotiated market-access commitments by o⁄ering new subsidies to their import-
competing ￿rms. At the same time, restrictions on domestic policies should not be too severe; for
example, subsidies can be a ￿rst-best instrument with which to target a domestic market failure.
This tension is re￿ ected in recent research that considers the optimal treatment of domestic subsidies
in a trade agreement, and also in recent work that explores related issues with respect to policies
that concern domestic labor and environmental standards (when the international externalities
associated with such standards are pecuniary).39 A related set of recent research considers whether
an agreement that links tari⁄s and standards might enhance e¢ ciency by facilitating improved
enforcement or information-revelation capabilities.40 Finally, recent work also indicates that the
treatment of domestic policies in a trade agreement should balance the additional contracting costs
associated with new rules for domestic policies against the degree to which such policies represent
an e⁄ective means of manipulating market access.41
A second area is the treatment of export policies in the GATT/WTO. While GATT rules
concerning export subsidies were somewhat permissive, export subsidies are now prohibited in the
WTO.42 A theory of how export subsidies should be treated in a trade agreement must begin by
explaining why a government might use an export subsidy. The theoretical literature emphasizes
that a government might use an export subsidy in a strategic fashion so as to shift pro￿ts or delocate
￿rms from competing foreign export sectors.43 In short-run models where pro￿ts can be shifted
but the location of ￿rms is ￿xed, the governments of countries that export a given good could
enjoy greater welfare if they were to reach an agreement under which they limit export subsidies.
This result appears to o⁄er a potential interpretation for the prohibition on export subsidies in
the WTO. This interpretation, however, neglects the interests of consumers in importing countries,
who bene￿t from the lower prices that export subsidies induce. Global welfare actually may be
lower when governments of exporting countries agree to limit export subsidies, and so these models
do not o⁄er a compelling rationale for the prohibition of export subsidies.44 In long-run models
where trade policies a⁄ect the entry and exit decisions of ￿rms, if transport costs exist, then a
country may be tempted to use an export subsidy, and such a subsidy would lower the welfare of
its trading partner. Recent work suggests, though, that a country may not ￿nd an export subsidy
attractive unless its import tari⁄ is also low. This work suggests that a ceiling on export subsidies
may be e¢ ciency enhancing from a global standpoint once import tari⁄s have been negotiated
to low levels, and it thereby provides a possible interpretation for the more restrictive treatment
39Copeland (1990) o⁄ers an early model of the limits of cooperation when some domestic policies are left unre-
stricted. Bagwell and Staiger (2006) develop a model that focuses on the treatment of domestic subsidies in e¢ cient
trade agreements, and they evaluate GATT and WTO rules from this perspective. For further discussion of the legal
rules concerning the use of domestic subsidies in GATT and now the WTO, see Sykes (2005). For further discussion
of the labor and environmental standards and trade-agreement theory, see Bagwell and Staiger (2001a, 2002b Ch.
8), Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2002) and Staiger and Sykes (2009).
40See, for example, Ederington (2001, 2002), Lee (2007), Limao (2005) and Spagnolo (2001).
41See Horn, Maggi and Staiger (forthcoming).
42For further discussion of the treatment of export subsidies in GATT and now the WTO, see Sykes (2005).
43For a survey of the strategic-trade literature, see Brander (1995).
44The same can be said for models of export subsidies based on political-economy considerations. For further
discussion, see Brander and Spencer (1985), Bagwell and Staiger (2001c) and Bagwell (2008).
29of export subsidies now found in the WTO.45 The treatment of export policies in GATT/WTO
represents an important direction for further research.
45Venables (1985) o⁄ers an initial treatment of the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect and the associated appeal of a unilateral
export subsidy. Bagwell and Staiger (2009d) consider a linear version of the model and establish that free trade is
then e¢ cient and that a country ￿nds a unilateral export subsidy appealing only once its import tari⁄ is su¢ ciently
low.
30References
Agur I. 2008. The U.S. trade de￿cit, the decline of the WTO and the rise of regionalism. Global Economy
Journal 8 (http://www.bepress.com/gej/vol8/iss3/4)
Anderson JA, van Wincoop E. 2002. Borders, trade and welfare. In Brookings Trade Forum 2001, eds.
Rodrik D, Collins S. Washington: Brookings Institute.
Antras P, Staiger RW. 2008. O⁄shoring and the role of trade agreements. NBER Working Paper No. 14285
Bagwell K. 2008. Remedies in the WTO: an economic perspective. In The WTO: Governance, Dispute
Settlement & Developing Countries, eds. Janow ME, Donaldson VJ, Yanovich A. Huntington, New
York: Juris Publishing
Bagwell K. 2009. Self-Enforcing trade agreements and private information. NBER Working Paper No.
14812
Bagwell K, Mavroidis PC, Staiger RW. 2002. It￿ s a question of market access. American Journal of
International Law 96: 56-76
Bagwell K, Mavroidis PC, Staiger RW. 2007. Auctioning countermeasures in the WTO. Journal of Inter-
national Economics 73: 309-32
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 1990. A theory of managed trade. American Economic Review 80: 779-95
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 1999a. An economic theory of GATT. American Economic Review 89: 215-48
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 1999b. Regionalism and multilateral tari⁄ cooperation. In International Trade
Policy and the Paci￿c Rim, eds. Piggott J, Woodland A. London: MacMillan
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2001a. Domestic policies, national sovereignty and international economic institu-
tions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 519-62
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2001b. Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multi-
lateral trading system. European Journal of Political Economy 17: 281-325
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2001c. Strategic trade, competitive industries and agricultural trade disputes.
Economics and Politics 13: 113-28
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2002a. Economic theory and the interpretation of GATT/WTO. The American
Economist 46: 3-19. Reprinted in New Frontiers in Economics, eds. Szenberg M, Ramrattan L.
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2002b. The Economics of the World Trading System. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2003. Protection over the business cycle. Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy
3: 1-43 (http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances.vol3/iss1/art3)
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2005a. Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of
GATT/WTO. Journal of International Economics 67: 268-94
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2005b. Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause.
The Journal of Legal Studies 34: 471-513
31Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2006. Will international rules on subsidies disrupt the world trading system?
Journal of International Economics 73: 309-32
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2007. Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO. Mimeogr.,
Stanford Univ.
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2009a. Delocation and trade agreements in imperfectly competitive markets.
Mimeogr., Stanford Univ.
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2009b. Pro￿t shifting and trade agreements in imperfectly competitive markets.
NBER Working Paper Number 14803
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2009c. What do trade negotiators negotiate about? Empirical evidence from the
World Trade Organization. Mimeogr., Stanford Univ.
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 2009d. The economics of trade agreements in the linear cournot delocation model.
Mimeogr., Stanford Univ.
Baldwin R. 1987. Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy. Economic Letters 24: 287-90
Battigalli P., Maggi G. 2002. Rigidity, discretion and the costs of writing contracts. American Economic
Review 92: 798-817
Beckett G. 1941. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program. New York: Columbia Univ. Press
Beshkar M. 2009. Trade skirmishes and safeguards: a theory of the WTO dispute settlement process.
Mimeogr., Yale Univ.
Bhagwati J. 1991. The World Trading System at Risk. Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Blonigen BA, Bown C. 2003. Antidumping and retaliation threats. Journal of International Economics
60: 249-73
Bond E, Park J-H. 2002. Gradualism in trade agreements with asymmetric countries. Review of Economic
Studies 69: 379-406
Bown, C.P. 2002. The economics of trade disputes, the GATT￿ s article XXIII and the WTO￿ s dispute
settlement understanding. Economics and Politics 14: 283-323
Bown C. 2004a. Trade policy under the GATT/WTO: empirical evidence of the equal treatment rule.
Canadian Journal of Economics 37: 678-720
Bown C. 2004b. On the economic success of GATT/WTO dispute settlement. Review of Economics and
Statistics 86: 811-23
Bown, C., 2004c. Trade disputes and the implementation of protection under the GATT: An empirical
assessment, Journal of International Economics 62: 263-294
Bown C, Crowley MA. 2006. Policy externalities: how U.S. antidumping a⁄ects Japanese exports to the
EU. European Journal of Political Economy 22: 696-714
Brainard L. 1994. Last one out wins: trade policy in an international exit game. International Economic
Review 35: 151-72
Brander JA. 1995. Strategic trade policy. In Handbook of International Economics, Volume 3, eds. Gross-
man GM, Rogo⁄ K. Amsterdam: North Holland
32Brander JA, Spencer BJ. 1981. Tari⁄s and the extraction of foreign monopoly rents under potential entry.
Canadian Journal of Economics 14: 371-89
Brander JA, Spencer BJ. 1984a. Trade warfare: tari⁄s and cartels. Journal of International Economics
16: 227-42
Brander JA, Spencer BJ. 1984b. Tari⁄ protection and imperfect competition. In Monopolistic Competition
and International Trade, ed. Kierzkowski. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Brander JA, Spencer BJ. 1985. Export subsidies and international market share rivalry. Journal of Inter-
national Economics 18: 83-100
Broda C, Limao N, Weinstein D. 2008. Optimal tari⁄s and market power: the evidence. American Economic
Review 98: 2032-65
Brock WA, Magee SP. 1978. The economics of special interest politics. American Economic Review 68:
246-50
Carmichael C. 1987. The control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences. Journal of
International Economics 23: 1-19
Caves RA. 1976. Economic models of political choice: Canada￿ s tari⁄ structure. Canadian Journal of
Economics 9: 278-300
Chisik R. 2003. Gradualism in free trade agreements: a theoretical justi￿cation. Journal of International
Economics 59: 367-97
Choi JP. 1995. Optimal tari⁄s and the choice of technology: discriminatory tari⁄s vs. the most favored
nation clause. Journal of International Economics 38: 143-160
Copeland B. 1990. Strategic interaction among nations: negotiable and non-negotiable trade barriers.
Canadian Journal of Economics 23: 84-108
Culbert J. 1987. War-time Anglo-American talks and the making of GATT. World Economy 10: 381-407
Dhingra, S., 2009. Reconciling observed tari⁄s and the median voter model. Mimeogr., The Univ. of
Wisconsin.
Dixit A. 1987. Strategic aspects of trade policy. In Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress,
ed. Bewley TF. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Ederington J. 2001. International coordination of trade and domestic policies. American Economic Review
91: 1580-93
Ederington, J. 2002. Trade and domestic policy linkage in international agreements," International Eco-
nomic Review 43: 1347-67
Estevadordal A, Freund C, Ornelas E. 2008. Does regionalism a⁄ect trade liberalization toward nonmem-
bers? Quarterly Journal of Economics 123: 1531-75
Ethier W. 2004. Political externalities, nondiscrimination, and a multilateral world. Review of International
Economics 12: 303-20
Feenstra R. 1995. Estimating the e⁄ects of trade policy. In The Handbook of International Economics,
Volume 3, eds. Grossman GM, Rogo⁄, K. Amsterdam: North Holland
33Feenstra R, Bhagwati J. 1982. Tari⁄ seeking and the e¢ cient tari⁄. In Import Competition and Response,
ed. Bhagwati J. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press
Findlay R., Wellisz, S. 1982. Endogenous tari⁄s, the political economy of trade restrictions and welfare. In
Import Competition and Response, ed. Bhagwati J. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press
Freund C. 2000. Multilateralism and the endogenous formation of free trade agreements. Journal of
International Economics 115: 1317-41
Freund C, Ornelas E. Forthcoming. Regional trade agreements. Annual Review 2.
Goldberg PK, Knetter MM. 1997. Goods prices and exchange rates: what have we learned? Journal of
Economic Literature 35: 1244-72
Goldstein J, Steinberg R. 2007. The rise of judicial liberalization at the WTO. Mimeogr., Stanford Univ.
Grossman GM, Helpman E. 1994. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 84: 833-50
Grossman GM, Helpman E. 1995. Trade wars and trade talks. Journal of Political Economy 103: 675-708
Helpman E, Krugman PR. 1989. Trade Policy and Market Structure. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
Hillman AL. 1982. Declining industries and political-support protectionist motives. American Economic
Review 72: 1180-87
Hoekman B, Kostecki M. 2001. The Political Economy of the World Trading System, 2nd Edition. Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press
Horn H, Maggi G, Staiger RW. Forthcoming. Trade agreements as endogenously incomplete contracts.
American Economic Review
Horn, H., Mavroidis PC (eds.). 2001-2007. The WTO case law: the American Law Institute reporters￿
studies (various years). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Press.
Hudec, RE. 1993. Enforcing international trade law: the evolution of the modern GATT legal system.
Butterworth Legal Publishers, New Hampshire.
Hudec RE. 2000. Broadening the scope of remedies in WTO dispute settlement. In Improving WTO
Dispute Settlement Procedures, eds. Weiss F, Weiss J. Cameron May
Jackson J. 1997. The World Trading System, 2nd edition. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press
Jawara F, Kwa A. 2003. Behind the Scenes at the WTO: the Real World of International Trade Negotiations.
London: Zed Books
Johnson HG. 1953-54. Optimum tari⁄s and retaliation. Review of Economic Studies 21: 142-53
Karacaovali B, Limao N. 2008. The clash of liberalizations: preferential vs. multilateral trade liberalization
in the European Union. Journal of International Economics 74: 299-327
Kennan J, Reizman R. 1988. Do big countries win tari⁄ wars? International Economic Review 29: 81-85
Klimenko M, Ramey G, Watson J. 2008. Recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement.
Journal of International Economics 74: 475-99
Kreinin M. 1961. E⁄ect of tari⁄ changes on the prices and volume of imports. American Economic Review
51: 310-24
34Krugman PR. 1997. What should trade negotiators negotiate about? Journal of Economic Literature 35:
113-20
Kowalczyk C, Riezman R. 2009. Trade agreements. Mimeogr., Tufts Univ.
Lee GM. 2007. Trade agreements with domestic policies as disguised protection. Journal of International
Economics 71: 241-59
Limao N. 2005. Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more
cooperative outcomes? Journal of International Economics. 67: 175-99
Limao N. 2006. Preferential trade agreements as stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization:
evidence for the U.S.. American Economic Review 96: 896-914
Limao N. 2007. Are preferential trade agreements with non-trade objectives a stumbling block for multi-
lateral liberalization? Review of Economic Studies 74: 821-55
Limao N, Saggi K. 2008. Tari⁄retaliation versus ￿nancial compensation in the enforcement of international
trade agreements. Journal of International Economics 76: 48-60
Ludema RD, Mayda AM. 2007. The free-riding e⁄ect of the mfn clause: evidence across countries. Mimeogr.
Johns-Hopkins Univ.
Ludema, R. 1991. International trade bargaining and the most-favored nation clause. Economics and
Politics 3: 1-20
Ludema RD, Mayda AM. Forthcoming. Do countries free ride on mfn? Journal of International Economics
Maggi G. 1999. The role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation. American Economic
Review 89: 190-214
Maggi G, Battigalli P. 2002. Rigidity, discretion and the costs of writing contracts. American Economic
Review 92: 798-817
Maggi G, Rodriguez-Clare A. 1998. The value of trade agreements in the presence of political pressures.
Journal of Political Economy 106: 574-601
Maggi G, Rodriguez-Clare A. 2007. A political-economy theory of trade agreements. American Economic
Review 97: 1374-1406
Maggi G, Staiger RW. 2008. On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade
agreements. NBER Working Paper No. 14067
Martin A, Vergote W. 2008. On the role of retaliation in trade agreements. Journal of International
Economics 76: 61-77
Matsuyama K. 1990. Perfect equilibria in a trade liberalization game. American Economic Review 80:
480-92
Mavroidis PC. 2000. Remedies in the WTO legal system: between a rock and a hard place. European
Journal of International Law 11: 763-813
Mayer W. 1981. Theoretical considerations on negotiated tari⁄ adjustments. Oxford Economic Papers 33:
135-53
35McCalman P. 2002. Multilateral trade negotiations and the most favored nation clause. Journal of Inter-
national Economics 57: 151-76
McMillan J. 1986. Game Theory in International Economics. New York: Harwood.
McMillan J. 1989. A game-theoretic view of international trade negotiations: implications for developing
countries. In Developing Countries and the Global Trading System: Volume 1, ed. Whalley J. Ann
Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press
Mill JS. 1844. Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy. London: Parker
Mitra D. 1999. Endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection: a long-run model of trade policy
determination. American Economic Review 89: 1116-34
Mrazova, M. 2009. ￿Trade Negotiations when Market Access Matters,￿Mimeogr. Oxford University.
Olson M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press
Ornelas E. 2005. Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism. European Eco-
nomic Review 49: 1717-35
Ornelas E. 2007. Exchanging market access at the outsiders￿expense: the case of customs unions. Canadian
Journal of Economics 40: 207-24
Ossa R. 2009. A ￿ new-trade￿theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. Mimeogr., Univ. of Chicago
Park JH. 2009. Private trigger strategies in the presence of concealed trade barriers. Mimeogr., Seoul
National Univ.
Petersmann E-U. 1997. The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International
Organizations and Dispute Settlement. London: Kluwer Law International Ltd.
Prusa T, Skeath S. 2001. The economic and strategic motives for antidumping ￿lings. Weltwirtshcaftliches
Archiv 138: 389-413
Regan DH. 2006. What are trade agreements for?: two con￿ icting stories told by economists, with a lesson
for lawyers. Journal of International Economic Law 9: 951-88
Rhodes C. 1993. Reciprocity, U.S. Trade Policy, and the GATT Regime. Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ.
Press
Rose A. 2004. Do we really know that the WTO increases trade? American Economic Review 94: 98-114
Saggi, K. 2004. Tari⁄s and the most favored nation clause. Journal of International Economics 63: 341-368.
Schwartz WF, Sykes AO. 1997. The economics of the most-favored-nation clause. In Economic Dimen-
sions in International Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, eds. Bhandani JS, Sykes AO.
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
Shirono K. 2004. Are WTO tari⁄ negotiations reciprocal? An analysis of tari⁄ liberalization. Mimeogr.,
Columbia Univ.
Spagnolo G. 2001. Issue linkage, credible delegation, and policy cooperation. CEPR Discussion Paper No.
2778
Spamann H. 2006. The myth of ￿ rebalancing￿retaliation in WTO dispute settlement practice. Journal of
International Economic Law 9: 31-79
36Staiger RW. 2006. What can developing countries achieve in the WTO? Journal of Economic Literature
44: 779-95
Staiger RW, Sykes AO. 2009. International trade and domestic regulation. Mimeogr., Stanford Univ.
Staiger RW, Tabellini G. 1987. Discretionary trade policy and excessive protection. American Economic
Review 77: 823-37
Staiger RW, Tabellini G. 1999. Do GATT rules help governments make domestic commitments? Economics
and Politics 11: 109-44
Subramanian A, Wei S-J. 2007. The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly. Journal of International
Economics 72: 151-75
Sykes AO, 2005. The economics of WTO rules on subsidies and countervailing measures. In The World
Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis. Vol. II, eds. Appleton A, Macrory P,
Plummer M. Springer-Verlag
Tang M-K, Wei S-J. Forthcoming. The value of making commitments externally: evidence from WTO
accessions. Journal of International Economics
Tasca HJ. 1938. The Reciprocal Trade Policy of the United States: A Study in Trade Philosophy. Philadel-
phia PA: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press
Tomz M, Goldstein J, Rivers D. 2007. Do we really know that the WTO increases trade? Comment.
American Economic Review 97: 2005-18
Torrens R. 1844. The Budget: On Commercial Policy and Colonial Policy. London: Smith, Elder
Venables A. 1985. Trade and trade policy with imperfect competition: the case of identical products and
free entry. Journal of International Economics 19: 1-20
Venables A. 1987. Trade and trade policy with di⁄erentiated products: a chamberlinian-ricardian model.
Economic Journal 97: 700-717
Wallace BB. 1933. Tari⁄ bargaining. Foreign A⁄airs. 1933: 621-33
Winters LA, Chang W. 2000. Regional integration and the prices of imports: an empirical investigation.
Journal of International Economics 51: 363-77
Winters LA, Chang W. 2002. How regional blocs a⁄ect excluded countries: the price e⁄ects of mercusor.
American Economic Review 92: 889-904
WTO. 2001. Annual Report 2001. Geneva
WTO. 2002. Dispute settlement body - special session - negotiations on improvements and clari￿ca-
tions of the dispute settlement understanding - proposal by Mexico: November 4, catalogue record
TN/DS/W/23
WTO Appellate Body 2004 United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (original complaint by the European
Communities)￿ Recourse to arbitration by the United States under 22.6 of the DSU. WT/DS136/ARB,
24 February
Zissimos B. 2007. The GATT and gradualism. Journal of International Economics 71: 410-33
37